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THE COMPUTER LENDS A HAND
I. PROOF PROBLEMS IN PRICE-FIXING
A. Introduction
Combinations and conspiracies to fix prices in interstate commerce
have been condemned by the Supreme Court 1 as a violation of the
Sherman Act.2 In the past, prosecution of price-fixing cases has been a
priority matter in the Department of Justice, and recent budget requests
by the Antitrust Division suggest that the prosecution of price-fixing will
increase and that the serious nature of the offense will become mag-
nified.3
Although conspiring to fix prices is clearly illegal, it is often difficult to
prove that such a conspiracy exists or has existed because of attempts by
the price-fixing group to eliminate or conceal evidence which suggests
an agreement. Uniform behavior among alleged conspirators may
suggest that an agreement to fix prices has been made. However, the
degree of uniformity sufficient to sustain a conspiracy verdict is unclear.4
The need for sources of proof to provide for adequate enforcement of
the antitrust laws has led to the development of a new technique to pro-
duce evidence in conspiracy cases. This technique, developed by Profes-
sor John M. Kuhlman of the University of Missouri-Columbia, utilizes a
computer 5 to analyze the past pricing behavior of competitors within a
given industry. The product of this analysis is made available in the
form of a computer printout. In this way theories about pricing behavior
may be tested and inferences from such behavior may be drawn.
1. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975) provides: "Every contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... [is] illegal.... ." Any person injured by
reason of violation of the antitrust laws may seek triple damages and the costs of
suit including reasonable attorney fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
3. See Statement of John H. Schenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of
Representatives. Concerning the Antitrust Division Authorization Request for
Fiscal Year 1979 (March 21, 1978), reprinted in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), Report
Letter No. 326, Part II, March 27, 1978.
4. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Pa. 1975), va-
cated, 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977) (inference of conspiracy through observation
of conscious parallel behavior not sufficient to sustain a finding of conspiracy).
5. Kuhlman, John M., Inferring Conduct from Performance: An Analysis of a
Price-Fixing Case.
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B. Conscious Parallelism and Proof
If competitors price their products identically, it strongly suggests col-
lusion to fix prices. 6 However, conspiring competitors usually behave
more subtly in order to conceal the fact that a price-fixing arrangement
exists. They may act in similar or uniform ways without following exactly
the same pricing strategies. They may conceal price-fixing while allocat-
ing market shares and stabilizing prices. On the other hand, similar or
uniform behavior within a market may be due to causes other than
price-fixing. If the costs of a product are standardized and the product
of each competitor may be easily substituted for that of the others, simi-
lar prices may be a natural occurrence.
In the majority of cases of suspected price-fixing, the prices are not so
identical as to clearly suggest collusion. However, they are so similar and
uniform as not to be completely explained by market forces. It is usually
clear that each competitor is aware of the others' conduct, but it is not
clear whether an agreement exists between the competitors. This situa-
tion has been labeled by the courts as conscious parallel behavior.
Both judges and economists have been reluctant to accept conscious
parallel behavior as evidence sufficient in itself to uphold a price-fixing
verdict.7 For those who advocate such an attitude, the Supreme Court's
famous edict in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp. has long served as their banner: "Circumstantial evidence of con-
sciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the judicial
attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely." 
8
The principal reason for this attitude is that oligopolistic market forces
foster similar pricing behavior in most cases in which price-fixing is al-
leged. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether similar pricing strategies
are the product of market forces or the product of collusion. The goal
of utilizing computer techniques is to find relationships among alleged
price-fixers that cannot be explained by mere conscious parallelism or
market forces. Whether computer-generated evidence serves this func-
tion requires a consideration of the role market forces play in pricing
behavior.
6. In FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948), the defendants' prices were
identical to one-millionth of a cent. The court agreed with the FTC and rejected
the defendants' contention that prices were controlled by the market.
7. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962). Turner suggests
that in an oligopoly sellers will take into account the probable reactions of their
competitors in setting prices. As a result, the pricing behavior is interdependent
and similar, but without an agreement to conspire. See also Turner, The Scope of
Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1226-27
(1969).
8. 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) (footnote omitted).
1978]
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C. The Oligopoly and Price Interdependence
In the perfectly competitive model there are many buyers and sellers;
a change in the pricing strategy of one seller will not have a significant
impact upon any other seller. In contrast, an oligopoly is characterized
by the existence of only a few sellers. A change in price by one seller will
have a substantial impact upon the others. In the perfectly competitive
model the effect of a price change will be spread among many sellers; in
an oligopoly a price change affects the competitors more sharply because
there are fewer of them. Thus, the seller in an oligopolistic market must
respond sharply to any significant change in a competitor's price in
order to preserve his market share, 9 and sellers in an oligopoly become
interdependent on one another's pricing strategies and production.1 °
The interdependence dictates that price adjustments be made regularly
in response to competitors' price changes in order to preserve the seller's
market share."
The oligopolistic competitor could choose to lower his prices in an
attempt to sell more and increase profits. However, there are reasons
why he would choose not to do so. He may be content to preserve his
market share and profits, or he may be unable to produce more.
Further, the selection of the exact price which would enable him to in-
crease both sales and profits may be difficult. There is also the possibility
that his competitors will retaliate against him through collective action. A
rational alternative may be an agreement with competitors to stabilize
prices. Such an agreement would reduce the market forces which cause
sellers within the oligopoly to act and react to price changes. All sellers
in an oligopoly have an incentive to collude to establish market shares
and guaranteed prices because of fear of retaliation by others if they
refuse.12
Price-fixing is also facilitated in an oligopoly because there are fewer
parties to the agreement. Agreement is easier to reach and to conceal
than where there are many parties. 3 Indeed, in most cases where
price-fixing is successful, the oligopoly has been a necessary condition
for the formation of the price-fixing conspiracy."
9. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562, 1563-64 (1969).
10. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Paral-
lelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
11. See L. SULLIVAN, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 110 (1977).
12. Comment, Price Systems and Competition: The Basing Point Issues, 58 YALE
L.J. 426, 433 (1949).
13. One economist suggests three principal reasons for collusion or conspir-
acy within an oligopoly: 1) it avoids the unpleasant contingencies posed by unre-
stricted competition; 2) there is little interference by the Department of Justice
which is concerned with more flagrant violations of the antitrust laws; and 3) it is
simple to coordinate by mutual agreement. Asch, Collusive Oligopoly: An Antitrust
Quandary, 2 ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REV. 53, 54 (Spring 1969).
14. Posner, supra note 9, at 1572.
[Vol. 43
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In a market composed of many sellers and buyers, the economic pres-
sures resulting from interdependence are absent. Thus, if price unifor-
mity occurs in a normal marketplace the inference of collusion is
strengthened because the oligopolistic forces are not in effect.'" Collu-
sion is easier to detect and adherence to the price-fixing agreement is
more difficult to enforce because there are a larger number of partici-
pants.
Because market forces play a more vital role in the pricing strategies
of oligopolistic sellers, economists disagree over the question whether
uniformity of pricing behavior within the oligopoly is itself evidence of
collusion.' 6 This attitude is also reflected by the courts' reluctance to
accept uniform behavior as sufficient evidence of price-fixing and re-
quirement that some other evidence of conspiracy be present.17
D. The Sealed Bid Market
The practice of many buyers in taking sealed bids both assures price-
fixing sellers of the continued vitality of their arrangement and provides
additional incentive to fix prices. This practice is a key factor in facilitat-
ing price-fixing in oligopolistic industries.' 8 Potential sellers submit a
sealed bid to the potential buyer, usually a government agency. Ideally,
the bidders will attempt to underbid each other and be awarded a lucra-
tive contract. However, once a winning bid is accepted, the prices of
both the winner and the losers are published. If interdependent be-
havior is already facilitated by an oligopolistic market structure, the pub-
lication of bids serves as a mechanism to check the prices of competitors
and to enforce any agreement to fix prices by allowing competitors to
compare bids and detect "cheaters." Bid publication enables competitors
to determine whether one of their number is cutting prices; this know-
ledge permits retaliation against the transgressor- by reducing prices
within the entire group. "A bid opening disseminates information that a
price cutter does not want known by his rival*s; that information, readily
dispensed, becomes useful in maintaining an oligopolistic understanding
on price among the suppliers." 19
The use of sealed bids is ineffective to encourage lower prices and in
fact tends to promote collusion and enforcement of price fixing agree-
15. Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d
199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
16. Posner is the principal advocate of the theory that uniform pricing be-
havior is unequivocal evidence of collusion. Posner, supra note 9, at 1587. On the
other hand, Turner suggests that noncompetitive uniform pricing may result
simply from interdependence. Turner, supra note 7, 75 HARv. L. REv. at 672.
17. See text accompanying notes 91-98 infra.
18. Miller, Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Government Procurement, 42
BROOKLYN L. REV. 208, 217 (1975) (causes, problems, and solutions to the prac-
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ments.2 0  Identical bidding in government procurement contracts has
often been associated with the practice of taking sealed bids.21 In the
presence of an oligopolistic market, sealed bidding is even more likely to
involve price-fixing arrangements.
22
It should be noted that the sellers did not create the sealed bid mar-
ket; it is the purchaser who dictates that sealed bids be made. The en-
trenchment of procuring agencies in this practice is thus a source of
encouragement to price-fixers.
E. Delivered Pricing
Delivered pricing is another practice permitted by buyers in the sealed
bid industry which facilitates price-fixing. In a delivered pricing system,
the bid price includes the cost of transportation; bids do not reveal the
cost of transportation which has been added to the price of the item
being purchased. The purchaser has no idea what the transportation
costs are, and there is no way of ascertaining the basic price without the
transportation cost.
Delivered prices ensure competitors that they can make a bid which
will not reflect transportation costs. In the case of an agreement to fix
prices at the delivered sealed bid price, competitors are assured of a
reciprocal opportunity to bid at a geographic location where a com-
petitor with lower transportation costs otherwise would have a significant
advantage. The purchaser is forced to pay a higher price than he would
if he could purchase the product where the transportation costs are
lower, i.e., he is forced to pay for "phantom" freight costs because the
price-fixing agreement has fixed the price where transportation costs are
highest.23
Oligopolistic market forces, sealed bidding, and delivered pricing all
contribute to the formation and continuation of price-fixing rings. The
oligopoly induces interdependent pricing behavior among competitors
20. Kuhlman, Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. REv. 69, 72 (Spring 1969).
21. See U.S. AT'y GENERAL, IDENTICAL BIDDING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT,
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 10936. This yearly
report published since 1961 includes details of instances of identical bids on gov-
ernment contracts. The publication is designed to discourage identical bids and
collusion. Identical bidding occurred in $16.8 million of advertised bids in 1975,
$19.2 million in 1974, and $17.9 million in 1973. These figures have decreased
from an all-time high in 1971 of $32.6 million.
22. Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d
199, 203 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962). The court recognized
the fact that consciously parallel behavior within a sealed bid market raises a
stronger inference of conspiracy.
23. See Comment, Price Systems and Competition: The Basing Point Issues, 58
YALE L.J. 426 (1949). This now out-of-date article is still the best authority for
the causes and effects of delivered pricing systems.
690 [Vol. 43
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and may lead to the establishment of a conspiracy. Sealed bidding pro-
vides a mechanism for the enforcement of the conspiracy and delivered
pricing serves as a tool for its operation. However, even where such fac-
tors exist and behavior is substantially uniform, courts have been likely
to classify the uniformity of conduct as conscious parallelism. 2 4 This
attitude is best represented by one jurist who expressed the view that
conscious parallel behavior "does not prove or tend to prove that it was
done by agreement ... anymore than proof that a hound is chasing a
fox is evidence that the chase is by agreement with the fox." 2 5
II. COMPUTER-GENERATED EVIDENCE
A. Theoretical Considerations
Because of the reluctance to uphold conspiracy verdicts on the basis of
mere circumstantial evidence of parallel behavior, enforcers of the anti-
trust laws have sought new ways to analyze market structures in order to
present evidence which raises a stronger inference of conspiracy.2 6 One
such method of analysis involves the use of a computer to analyze, or-
ganize, and summarize data. The computer can search, make compari-
sons, and print the results in a logical manner that would otherwise take
substantial time if done by human physical and mental processes. The
information to be processed is selected on the premise that in an indus-
try where certain characteristics exist it is likely that price-fixing will oc-
cur, and that those characteristics will allow the existence of price-fixing
to be detected. 27 Such characteristics include the existence of a
homogenous product, inelastic demand for the product, relatively stable
technology and little product innovation, sealed bids, and substantial
entry barriers to newcomers in the industry.28
24. The history of this judicial attitude may be traced to a time in American
history when the Supreme Court adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward the regu-
lation of business. The trade association cases in the 1920's are representative.
See Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement
Mfrs' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925). In both cases the
Court was concerned primarily with the rights of trade associations. Despite sub-
stantial uniformity of prices, the Court was inclined to believe the defendants'
evidence that pricing was independent and dependent on supply and demand.
See also United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
25. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram -& Sons, 182 F.2d 228, 233 (7th
Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
26. For a discussion of the role of quantitative analysis in researching the
structure of an industry, see Lozowick, Steiner & Miller, Law and Quantitiative
Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1641 (1968).
27. See Kuhlman, supra note 20, at 69; Erickson, Economics of Price Fixing, 2
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, at 83 (1969). See also Thompson, Price Fixing,
Consumer Injury, and Policy Planning for the Regional Offwes, 7 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. REV. No. 2, at 89 (1974-1975) (memorandum by a member of the FTC on
detection of price-fixing utilizing Kuhlman's strategy).
28. Kuhlman, supra note 20, at 74.
1978]
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The data to be assimilated are information concerning the sellers, the
buyers, the bids, and the winning bids within the industry.2 This in-
formation may be obtained through the bid-letting public agency or
through the discovery process in litigation. 30 All information is placed
on computer cards, read by the computer, and organized as the pro-
grammer directs. Certain programs are utilized to detect activities
characteristic of price-fixing. These programs are not overly compli-
cated, but they do require the direction of an expert economist prepared
to interpret the data and explain its significance in the courtroom. The
search for specific characteristics among the alleged price-fixing group
includes detection of (a) geographic market division; (b) periodicity in
bidding behavior or the observation of bidding behavior that follows a
systematic pattern over time; (c) price relationships between bidders; (d)
price relationships between the prices of subproducts; (e) price relation-
ships over space; and (f) price relationships over time.3 1
An example of this process and its application to a specific case will be
illustrated in this comment.3 2 The data presented was gathered from an
antitrust suit filed in 1969 by a number of cities against the sellers of a
standardized product. Because the traditional discovery process yielded
no incriminating 'evidence or "hot documents," the only information
which proved to be useful was a compilation of bid tabulation reports
for the period from 1964 to 1970. As a result, the case, scheduled for
1975, was to be tried solely on computer-processed economic data. The
suit was settled shortly before trial. However, the techniques used to de-




An assumption basic to the use of the computer to assimilate evidence
is that collusive sellers will generate visible traces of their conspiracy 34
which can be discovered and interpreted through various relationships.
The computer serves as a vehicle for testing hypothetical relationships
29. Required information specifically includes: (a) the agency letting the in-
dividual bid and its address, including zipcode; (b) the shipping destination of
the product, including zipcode; (c) the point of origin, including zipcode; (d) a
code for each product and subproduct; (e) report of bid prices; and (f) the win-
ning bid. Kuhlman, A Proposal for the Detection of Price Fixing, 7 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. REv., No. 2, at 97 (1974-1975).
30. See text accompanying notes 39-55 infra.
31. Kuhlman, supra note 29, at 99.
32. For another example of the use of economic theory to successfully prose-
cute price fixing, see Funderburk, Price Fixing in the Liquid-Asphalt Industry:
Economic Analysis Versus the "Hot Document", 7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 1,
at 61 (1974).
33. See Kuhlman, supra note 5.
34. Posner, supra note 9, at 1587.
692 [Vol. 43
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and for depicting such relationships in the form of computer printouts.
The types of relationships that can be discovered are illustrated by the
information compiled in the settled case.
The product was sold in a nationwide market and there were some
50,000 bids let by cities in forty-nine states. There were only five princi-
pal sellers or producers and thus the market structure was oligopolistic.
The'product was required to meet a minimum standard of specifications
and each firm's product was fungible, i.e., one firm's product of a given
size would substitute for another firm's product of the same size. There
were several product sizes, but the most commonly purchased were the
four smallest sizes. Finally, the product was sold through sealed bids on
a delivered pricing basis; the price included all transportation costs. Be-
cause of the uniformity in the way the product was manufactured and
offered for sale, the products could be compared on a price basis. 35
Several relationships were discovered among the pricing behaviors of
the defendants that indicated that much more than competition or mar-
ket forces were affecting the prices charged by each firm. These rela-
tionships have been somewhat simplified in this text and the reader
should understand that some of the materials are a sample of the actual
data. In an actual case, each defendant's behavior would be analyzed and
compared. For the sake of brevity, data on all defendants has not been
provided.
Figure 1 is a computer printout of bid prices for the five largest firms
within the industry. It is basically a picture of the price behavior of the
industry during the period from 1964 to the end of 1970 and illustrates
the distribution of bid prices during that period.3 6 The horizontal axis
represents bid-lettings on a chronological basis. The vertical axis repre-
sents each bid as a percentage of the bidder's list price. Each dot repre-
sents a bid by a given company and in that same column will be bids on
the same contract by the four other firms. For example, the first entries
in the far left-hand column might represent bids submitted to a buyer in
St. Louis. The second column could represent a buyer in another city in
the same time period. Although the clusters of bids do not allow accu-
rate selection of each column and place at a given date, it is possible to
draw inferences from the overall picture. The expert economist who was
prepared to testify had separated the figures into four distinct time
periods. During period I and the succeeding period II, the pricing be-
havior of the sellers was clustered and the economist was prepared to
testify that this is an indication of similar pricing strategies. The pricing
35. These factors may make an industry prone to price fixing. See text ac-
companying notes 27-28 supra.
36. Bid prices were available for January 1, 1964 through December 31,
1970, plus a relatively small number for the periods 1971 through 1974.
Kuhlman, supra note 5.
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DISTRIBUTION OF BID PRICES, 1964-69
Bid Price as a Percentage of Bidder's List Price




96% , . 8.... I.
92% -4
92%........ ........ .-
88% - • .. .... '
-.d " " "'.-% "' . "
84%" - - - . . .
• -. .-. S . . .S
80% ... '




Period I Period II Period III Period IV
Figure I
Adapted from Kuhlman, Inferring Conduct from Performance: An Analysis of a
Price Fixing Case, 6 INDUS. ORG. REV. 1 (1978).
strategy indicated could be described as parallel behavior. In period III,
there is a slight dispersion in pricing behavior as compared to the earlier
periods. This might be explained by the fact that new firms had entered
the industry resulting in increased competition.
It is period IV which shows a substantial change in the firms' pricing
behavior. The pricing strategies dispersed markedly. This dispersal is
significant because period IV marks the commencement of the antitrust
suit against the sellers. The industry was characterized thereafter by vig-
orous competition.
The dramatic change in behavior raises an inference that the filing of
the antitrust suit caused the firms to change their pricing behavior from
collusion to competition. The behavior also suggests that the firms tacitly
admitted their guilt by changing their pricing after the suit was filed.
9
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Figure 1 was supported by other evidence which strengthens the in-
ference of collusion. The mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of
variation were computed for prices of the smallest size product during
the same time periods. An examination of those values indicates the
same pricing relationships illustrated in Figure 1. During the period
from 1964 to mid-1969, the standard deviation from the mean and the
coefficient of variation of each firm's bids did not differ substantially
from that of any other firm. See Table I, Columns A-C. Furthermore,
prices on successive bids could be predicted to be within those values.
However, in the middle of 1969, which correlates to the commencement
of the suit, each firm began to alter its pricing behavior and the differ-
ences between the mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation
for each firm increased significantly. See Table I, Columns D-E.
Table II illustrates the average bid prices for the smallest size product
by geographic area for several time periods from 1964 to 1970. 3 7 In
Average Bid Prices for the Smallest Size Unit
By Time Period and Geographical Location
Location Firm
(first digit Time
of zip code) Period 1 2 3 4 5 Range
0 1964-65 29.33 29.43 29.92 29.53 29.29 .63
1965-66 31.83 31.55 31.72 31.59 31.91 .36
1966-69 34.10 34.32 34.36 34.26 34.12 .26
1969-70 34.09 36.95 36.85 36.98 35.97 1.88
1 1964-65 29.05 29.68 29.26 29.29 29.01 .67
1965-66 31.15 30.91 31.27 30.74 30.34 .81
1966-69 33.34 34.02 34.27 33.50 33.60 .93
1969-70 33.65 33.60 36.15 36.23 34.61 2.95
2 1964-65 28.98 28.75 28.81 28.86 28.49 .49
1965-66 30.24 31.66 30.80 30.97 31.59 1.42
1966-69 33.13 33.38 33.06 33.25 33.15 .32
1969-70 33.09 35.93 35.12 35.13 34.80 2.84
3 1964-65 29.22 29.16 29.24 29.05 29.70 .65
1965-66 30.96 31.01 31.20 30.88 30.87 .33
1966-69 33.41 33.86 33.91 33.70 33.47 .50
1969-70 33.28 36.30 35.61 35.48 34.39 3.02
37. One might hypothesize that because the firms were located in different
parts of the contiguous United States, their bidding would reflect differences in
transportation costs. The entire Table of which Table II is only a part indicated
that transportation costs were not reflected in bid prices. For example, the aver-
age bid in the West generally did not differ from the average prices bid in the
Northeast. Kuhlman, supra note 5.
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Adapted from Kuhlman, Inferring Conduct from Performance: An Analysis of a
Price Fixing Case, 6 INDUS. ORG. REV. 1 (1978).
the far right-hand column the range between the highest and lowest av-
erage bid between firms was computed. The ranges for all areas shown
was slight for the first three time periods. However, in the period after
the suit was filed (1969-70), the range of all average bid prices increased
significantly. Again, the data suggests a change in behavior due to the
commencement of the suit.
A further comparison of firm against firm is made in Table III. In
constructing this table the bids of all firms for the smallest size product
12
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were placed in pairs. The smaller bid was subtracted from the larger and
the difference was divided by the smaller and computed as a percentage.
Thus, the figures in each horizontal row are the percentage of bids
which differed by 0%, less than 1%, less than 2%, and so on. A compari-
son of these percentages shows the same change in behavior occurring at
the commencement of the suit. For example, if the first three percentage
columns in line 1 are added together, they indicate that in 1964 a total
of 68.2% of the bids differed by less than 2%. If the same procedure is
followed in line 6, the figures indicate that in the six-month period be-
fore the suit was filed in 1969, almost 50% of the bids differed by less
than 2%. However, the same calculation for the six-month period after
the suit was filed (line 7) indicates that the percentage of bids differing
by less than 2% fell to 30.7%. Again, this change in behavior after suit
was filed suggests that the firms were engaged in collusive -price-fixing in
the prior periods.
Comparison of Bid Pairs in Percentage Differences
(1964-74)
Percentage Differences in Bid Pairs
Number
of
Year Pairs 0 <1% <2% <3% <4% <5% <6%
1. 1964 6743 1.8% 45.8% 20.6% 12.9% 8.9% 4.4% 2.7%
2. 1965 6552 1.7 40.6 18.9 12.3 7.3 4.2 2.7
3. 1966 6676 1.8 41.1 20.6 11.9 8.6 5.2 2.6
4. 1967 7094 1.0 37.8 20.1 14.5 10.9 5.9 3.9
5. 1968 6819 .9 32.8 17.2 12.2 11.4 6.6 4.7
1969
6. 1st half 3828 1.0 33.4 15.0 13.6 10.2 7.7 5.4
7. 2nd half 1591 .9 18.8 11.0 5.8 6.1 6.0 6.3
8. 1970 5645 .6 19.9 13.4 8.0 8.1 5.5 5.0
9. 1972-74 632 .6 1.7 3.3 4.0 2.5 4.4 4.1
Table III
Adapted from Kuhlman, Inferring Conduct from Performance: An Analysis of e
Price Fixing Case, 6 INDUS. ORG. REV. 1 (1978).
One method for price-fixers to establish pricing systems and to con.
tinue setting prices with minimal communication between the parties is
to agree to establish prices based upon a formula. Valuable evidence of a
price-fixing conspiracy might be obtained by establishing the basis of the
pricing scheme, monitoring the scheme, and perhaps discovering the
13
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formula used to establish prices. 3 8 A computer can be helpful in this
situation because it can make the numerous calculations necessary to de-
tect formula pricing. In this case a formula was hypothesized and tested
with the aid of the computer.
Each firm had a basic price list for the several sizes of the product.
These list prices were based upon the quantity purchased; the larger the
quantity purchased, the lower was the unit price. In addition, each firm
had different quantity discounts. Despite the existence of different dis-
count schedules, it was ascertained that every firm based its product
price on the formula depicted in Table IV. The price of the smallest size
product was the base price. The price for successive sizes in an order of
the same quantity was a function of the base price and a multiplier for
each successive size. Thus, the price of a size 2 item was 1.5 times the
base price, the price of size 3 was 2.2 times the base price, and price of
size 4 was approximately 4.1 times the base price. During the period
preceding the suit, the firms adhered to these multiples with slight vari-
ation.
Price of Seven Smallest Units as a Multiple of Size 1
(1969)
Product Size Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5
1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
4 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0
5 6.2 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.0
6 12.5 12.5 12.0 12.0 12.0
7 20.6 20.6 20.0 - 20.0
Table IV
Adapted from Kuhlman, Inferring Conduct from Performance: An Analysis of a
Price Fixing Case, 6 INDUS. ORG. REV. 1 (1978).
38. See Geiss & Kuhlman, Estimating Price Lists, List Charges, and Market Shares
from Sealed Bids, 86 J. POL. ECON. 193 (1978) (another study of the industry re-
vealing a process upon which behavior of firms can be monitored and pricing
behavior predicted).
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It can be argued that the price lists were public knowledge and that
the relationships were a result of product similarities and price leader-
ship. However, the legality of such pricing behavior is seriously ques-
tioned by the fact that the multiplier relationships carried over into
sealed bids, which were supposed to be secret. Thus, even in sealed bids,
the firms adhered to the base prices in the price lists and the same for-
mula relationships among product sizes existed for all firms.
Indeed, firms failed to lower prices or shade from the price list de-
spite the fact that a given firm would lose several successive bids. It ap-
peared that firms continued to bid high even though they lost the bid at
a given locale on prior occasions. This is illustrated in Table V. The left
column represents the purchaser in several successive lettings of bids.
When Firm 1 lost the first bid to Firm 3, it nevertheless failed to lower
its prices in subsequent bids. Similarly, Firms 4 and 5 declined to com-
pete with Firm 3. The data suggests that the other firms did not want to
compete with Firm 1 although it appears that lower bids would allow
them to sell their product to the purchasing agency. 39
Bid Prices of Firms 3, 4, and 5 when Firm 1 Bid $34.72
(1966-69)
(Firm 2 did not bid on these jobs)
Successive bids in
a single locale Firm 1 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5
1 $34.72 $33.84 $34.80 (no bid)
2 34.72 33.84 34.80 $34.60
3 34.72 33.84 34.80 34.60
4 34.72 33.84 34.80 34.60
Table V
Adapted from Kuhlman, Inferring Conduct from Performance: An Analysis of a
Price Fixing Case, 6 INDUS. ORG. REV. 1 (978).
Table V is only a small sample of the behavior of Firm 1; other data
indicated similar indifference to competition by Firm 1, as well as identi-
cal behavior by the other defendants in other markets. Although such a
39. Repeated unsuccessful bidding suggests an unwillingness to compete for
a particular agency's letting of bids. If this was frequent and if similar behavior
occurred in relation to other bidders in other markets, some type of horizontal
territorial allocation could be inferred. By allocating market shares, the firms
could bid noncompetitively and maintain higher prices.
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theory was never tested, it suggests that some type of market division
existed between the defendants.
Importantly, the multiplier relationship was prevalent during the
period preceding the antitrust suit. After the suit was commenced, the
relationships fell apart and competition flourished. The firms began to
shade their bids from their price list and the multiplier relationship did
not dictate the price between the size of the products.
Much of the information which has been presented indicates the role
the computer can play in compiling statistical information. It can serve
as a tool to test relationships among statistical data and reveal patterns of
behavior. Figure 1 is an example of how these relationships may be dis-
played graphically.
III. DISCOVERY, ADMISSIBILITY, AND SUBMISSIBILITY OF
COMPUTER-GENERATED EVIDENCE
A. Discovery
Thorough pretrial discovery is essential for both parties if technical
evidence is sought to be admitted at trial. As a general rule, the propo-
nent of computer-generated evidence should disclose his intention to use
such evidence to both his adversary and the court well in advance of
trial. Such disclosure facilitates discovery and allows the opponent to
familiarize himself with the nature of computer-generated evidence in
order to prepare objections and cross-examination at trial. It also allows
the judge to familiarize himself with computer evidence and the applica-
ble law before trial.40
All the underlying data, proposed exhibits, and the substance of tes-
timony to be given should be made available to opposing counsel in ad-
vance of trial. 41 The reason for such complete disclosure is fairness;
whenever technical or scientific data are to be used as evidence, fairness
within the framework of the adversary system requires that the opposi-
tion have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response.42 An oppo-
nent of such evidence could not properly prepare for trial without dis-
closure. Disclosure supplemented by discovery also may serve to avoid
lengthy, technical issues 43 and permit objections to be raised and possi-
bly resolved before trial.44 Pretrial familiarization of all parties with the
40. Jenkins, Computer-Generated Evidence Specially Prepared for Use at Trial, 52
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 600 (1975).
41. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.711
(1977) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
42. See Schuck, Techniques for Proof of Complicated Scientific and Economic Facts,
40 F.R.D. 33 (1966). The failure to give adequate notice of an intention to use
neutron activation analysis in a criminal case resulted in a conviction being over-
turned. See United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969).
43. Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 987 (1976).
44. MANUAL, supra note 41, § 2.711.
19781
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technical aspects of computer-generated evidence may allow issues to be
more narrowly defined and permit complex antitrust litigation to be
shortened.
In criminal cases in which computer evidence has been prepared, de-
fense counsel have been allowed access to the prosecution's computer
data, 45 as long as the party opposing the evidence has not unduly de-
layed requesting discovery.46 By analogy, those considerations should
apply to computer-generated evidence in civil or criminal antitrust cases.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide adequate discovery
techniques for the party against whom computer evidence is offered.
Rule 34 allows a party to request documents or data compilations in the
possession of the opposing party. 47 This rule arguably should allow the
discovery of computer evidence which will be offered at trial. The sig-
nificance and interpretation of such evidence may be discovered by re-
quiring the proponent to reveal the identity of experts to be called at
trial, the subject matter upon which they will testify, and the substance
and basis of the experts' opinions.48
The expert to be called at trial in an antitrust case will be an
economist. Although his expertise may be involved in the preparation of
the evidence for trial, he probably will not be the computer program-
mer. Undoubtedly, the party against whom computer evidence, if admit-
ted, will be used will need to know the manner in which the computer
was programmed and the underlying documents used in the programs.
However, the computer programmer probably will not be called at trial
and the federal rules permit the discovery of facts and opinions of such
an expert only upon a showing of "exceptional circumstances." 49
The issue whether facts and opinions known by a "nontrial" computer
expert are discoverable in an antitrust action was litigated in Pearl Brew-
ing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 5 0 The court ordered the proponent of
computer evidence to make its computer programmers avaiiable for de-
positions and to provide documentation revealing the details of its com-
puter programs. The court justified its decision by saying that the use of
the specialized computer evidence constituted the exceptional cir-
cumstance required by the rule.5 1
45. See United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
985 (1975); United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 825 (1970); United States v. De Georgzia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969).
46. United States v. Greenlee, 517 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
985 (1975).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a), Notes of Advisory Committee. See twald, Discovery
and the Computer, 1 LITIGATION 27 (Spring 1975).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4). See also MANUAL, supra note 41, § 260.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (B).
50. 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
51. Id. at 1134-40.
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Discovery is also important to the proponent of computer evidence to
obtain the basic bid data to be processed by the computer. Although the
plaintiff may have such information already in his possession, it is pref-
erable to require the defendants to produce it through discovery. This
method establishes the bids as admissions,5 2 and as a result the defend-
ants will be more likely to insure the accuracy of the documents pro-
duced. The documents furnished by the defendants also can be
crosschecked with the bid-letting agencies' documents for accuracy. If
the defendant holds business records within computer files, discovery
also may be used to obtain the computer tapes and develop circumstan-
tial evidence from the computerized business records. 53 Of course, dis-
covery is not unlimited. Discovery may be limited by the court to rele-
vant issues and further limited by weighing the burden of production
against the importance of the information sought.5 4 For example, in
Pearl Brewing the court refused to order the proponent of the computer
evidence to provide information about alternative computer programs,
input data, and calculations constructed by the plaintiff but rejected in
favor of the systems in use.55 In addition to those protections, a court
also may make appropriate provision for the protection of original com-
puter data and for the expense of duplication. 56
B. Admissibility
There are significant evidentiary problems involved in the use of
computer-generated evidence. Hearsay problems are inherent because
the computer printout is based upon the defendants' bidding data and
thus the bids, in one form or another, will be offered to prove the truth
of their contents. Therefore, the question whether the bids are in fact
those of the defendant is raised. An additional problem is laying an
adequate foundation for the admission of computer evidence.
The hearsay problems are not insurmountable. A plaintiff in a price-
fixing case will request the defendants to produce documents or records
providing basic bidding data. Therefore, this data initially may be clas-
sified as the defendants' business records57 or admissions of a party op-
52. See text accompanying notes 56 & 57 infra.
53. See Bernacchi & Lansen, Philosophy, Data Processing and the Rules of Evi-
dence, 10 A.B.A. LAW NOTES FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 11 (1974).
54. United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 268 F. Supp. 769, 774
(D.N.J. 1966).
55. 415 F. Supp. at 1134-40.
56. FED. R. Civ. P., 26(b) (4) (C). See United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996
(2d Cir. 1976), in which the court required the taxpayer pay for duplication of
tapes sought by the Internal Revenue Service. Apparently the court believed he
could better afford it than the IRS. The Internal Revenue Code has a provision
which covers the production of computer data. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1970).
57. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
1978]
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ponent,5 8 both of which are exceptions to the exclusionary rule against
hearsay. However, the bidding data changes form as it is processed and
finally takes the form of computer printouts. For example, the defend-
ants' bidding data will be recorded on cards punched by a machine,
stored on magnetic tape, and eventually processed within the computer
before being presented upon a computer printout. As a result, when the
process of computer analysis has been completed, there are two eviden-
tiary problems. The business records or admissions of the defendant
may be characterized as one level of hearsay, but the computer trans-
forms the defendants' business records or admissions into another level
of hearsay; the change in form may involve double-hearsay or a violation
of the original writing requirement.59
Such difficulty may be overcome by an assertion that computer-
generated evidence in a price-fixing case is basically a summary of
economic evidence prepared from the defendants' bidding data. Sum-
maries of evidence are necessary to streamline complex antitrust litiga-
tion 60 and may "materially reduce the burden of analyzing a mass of
complex factual data." 6 1 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for the
admission of summaries of voluminous writings or records as an excep-
tion to hearsay and the original writing requirement.6 2 The summaries
may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation.6 3
Thus, under the federal rule, both the bidding data and the calculations
used in the analysis of the data are admissible.
Before the evidence may be admitted, a proper foundation for the
computer data must be laid. This requires that the system which gener-
ated the evidence be established as reliable and accurate.64 Cases involv-
ing authentication of computer evidence have been concerned with the
admission of business records stored within computers.6" The
58. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2). This hearsay exceptiofi includes statements
made by co-conspirators during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
59. FED. R. EvID. 1002.
60. United States v. National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind.
1961). See also MANUAL, supra note 41, § 2.71.
61. Melinder v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 451, 454-55 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
See also 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1230 (1972); Yoffe v. United States, 153 F.2d
570 (1st Cir. 1946); United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 314 U.S. 616 (1941); In re Bell Tone Records, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 642 (D.N.J.
1950).
62. FED. R. EvID. 1006. The court may order production of the underlying
documents. See also MANUAL, supra note 41, § 2.711.
63. FED. R. EvIn. 1006.
64. FED. R. EVID. 901(b) (9), Notes of Advisory Committee.
65. See cases collected in United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974); United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d
889 (9th Cir. 1969). The new federal rules permit the introduction of computer
evidence after an adequate foundation is laid. FED. R. EvID. 901(b) (9). See also
the accompanying Notes of Advisory Committee. Business records are admissible
704 [Vol. 43
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computer-generated evidence in price-fixing cases is different in that it is
not a business record itself but is a summary or reorganization of the
defendants' business records 66 or their admissions. The reason for au-
thentication is clear in both situations. When a party offers computer
evidence generated from his own computer, it is as if the computer were
testifying before the court. Although the rules of evidence provide a
theory for admissibility, absent safeguards the computer could lie just as
a witness could and there is no way for the judge or jury to gauge its
credibility.67  Furthermore, information in a computer can be lost or
manipulated to favor or injure either party. 68
To lay the proper foundation, an expert familiar with the computer
used to generate the evidence must testify for the accuracy of the pro-
cess. One author has suggested that accuracy and reliability of computer
evidence may be proved by: (1) studying the way the information en-
tered the system for human or computer error; (2) evaluating the pro-
gram to ascertain whether the evidence has been altered; (3) investigat-
ing the safeguards used to makF sure no alterations have occurred; and
(4) judging the credibility of the witness who presents the evidence in
court.
69
This process may be divided into several steps.7 0  First, the expert
must be qualified through testimony regarding education, training, ex-
perience, and familiarity with the use of computers. 71  Second, the ex-
pert must testify that the nature of the input information and the
mechanics of input control insure accuracy during the computer's opera-
tion. This is to insure that correct information is fed into the computer.
as an exception to the hearsay rule under FED. R. EvID. 803(b). See Transport
Idem. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965). See also cases collected in
Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1377 (1967 & Supp. 1977). For an authoritative and com-
prehensive article relating to the hearsay exception, see Tapper, Evidence from
Computers, 8 GA. L. REV. 562 (1974).
66. The problem with admitting a summary as a business record is that the
summary is not made in the regular course of business at or near the time of
event. See Harned v. Credit Bureau, 513 P.2d 650 (Wyo. 1973). However, once
the business records are admitted, summaries of those records ar6 admissible. See
Cotton v. John Eshelman & Sons, Inc., 137 Ga. App. 360, 223 S.E.2d 757 (1976).
67. Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, 52 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 547 (1976).
68. Id. at 563.
69. Id. at 562.
70. Freed, The Computer in Court: Are Computer Records Legal Evidence?, in R.
FREED, COMPUTERS AND LAW: A REFERENCE WORK (1973), reprinted in 16 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 339 (1965).
71. The supervisor of the computer center where the information was pro-
cessed should not be required to testify as long as the individual testifying is
sufficiently familiar with the computer system. See D & H Auto Parts, Inc. v.
Ford Marketing Corp., 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. 856 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); En-
dicott Johnson Corp. v. C. M. Golde, 190 N.W.2d 752 (N.D. 1971).
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Third, the expert must testify that the computer retained accurate in-
formation during processing and did not alter or lose information dur-
ing the computer's operation. The probability of computer error also
should be evaluated, with mention of the size and type of the computer
installation. The expert should give his opinion of the accuracy of
machine computations and also should state his opinion to the effect that
the program did not alter the data, but merely reorganized and sum-
marized it.72 Finally, the expert should discuss the control of printouts
to prevent printing error.
Laying the foundation may take substantial time; it is often appro-
priate and desirable to do so outside the hearing of the jury.7 The trial
also may be facilitated by requiring objections to the computer evidence
to be litigated prior to trial.7 4  One case suggests that once an aura of
reliability for computer business records has been established, only specific
objections to the evidence's reliability may be prcsented at trial.7 5 The
effect of such a ruling would be to force the opponent of the computer
data to produce evidence to show that the computer records are prejudi-
cial or unreliable.76  This shift in the burden of producing evidence is
also appropriate in the situation in which the computer is used to de-
velop circumstantial evidence, because many of the questions of reliabil-
ity can be resolved before trial through discovery and cooperation be-
tween the parties. 77
Once the foundation has been laid and the computer evidence has
been admitted, the court may order the underlying documents or origi-
nal business records to be produced. 78  Admission of the underlying
documents allows the court or the jury to examine the credibility of the
evidence by cross-checking the computer evidence with the documents.
The computer data or summaries may be reproduced in the form of
charts or tables to emphasize certain facts. 79  To be admissible, such
72. A simple but time consuming method is to check the data obtained from
the computer against the underlying documents. If the computer has made sim-
ple calculations, they may also be checked by hand. This process enables the
expert to testify that data within the computer has not been altered. It also
should be noted that by allowing the party against whom such evidence will be
admitted to examine the printouts before trial, the proponent's attention will be
called to errors prior to trial if he asks, through discovery, for any objections to
the proposed evidence.
73. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1157 (1974).
74. MANUAL, supra note 41, § 2.71.
75. See Olympic Ins. Co. v. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969).
76. See Tapper, supra note 63, at 562 (regarding business records).
77. See DeHetre, Data Processing Evidence - Is It Different?, 52 Cm.-KENT L.
REv. 567 (1976), for an examination of the process by which an adversary can
investigate the reliability of computer information to be used against him.
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presentations must satisfy the court that they accurately represent the
data as generated by the computer.80 Once the court is assured that the
nature of the evidence is trustworthy, its weight and credibility may be
scrutinized through the direct and cross-examination of an expert
economist familiar with the evidence, or by the opponent's own expert
witness.
C. Testimony of the Expert Economist
It must be emphasized that it is not the computer which makes the
observations or interpretations of behavior. "The computer's contribu-
tion ... is to permit the economist to analyze large amounts of data and
obtain a cost and temporal view of the data which would not otherwise
be possible."81 Because the issues in the case may be quite complex, the
relative strength or weakness of the expert's opinion may be the most
important factor in a jury or judge's determination. 2 The computer is
merely a sophisticated tool.
In addition to the expert's role at trial, he must supervise the prepara-
tion of the computer data. Thus, the expert's role is to organize the
evidence, explain the evidence at trial, and state an opinion upon the
facts as perceived by him.8 3 The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the
expert to testify to those matters of which he has personal knowledge8 4
and facts or data which have been made known previous to trial or at
trial. 15 Therefore, the expert could testify as to the facts with which he
has become acquainted through his research prior to trial as well as
those matters of which he has become aware at the trial itself.
80. For an example of charts or tables introduced in antitrust litigation, see
United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Ill.
1954). In United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78
(S.D. Cal. 1955), defendants introduced statistical charts which the court believed
were evidence that a conspiracy did not exist. Statistical evidence can never take
the form of mere speculation. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1969).
81. Kuhlman, supra note 5, at 99.
82. For a general discussion of the role of the economic expert in antitrust
litigation, and his testimony as to the structure, conduct, and performance of an
industry, see Scanlon, Economics in the Courtroom: The 'Technology' of Antitrust Liti-
gation, 3 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 1, 43, 55-112 (1969). The fact that the
computer expert and the economics expert are not the same person requires a
somewhat more burdensome foundation problem. However, it also provides an
advantage in that the credibility of the evidence is enhanced by the fact that the
programmer is independent, and hence the expert could not as readily manipu-
late the information to favor one party.
83. "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless
the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to dis-
close the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." FED. R. EVID. 705.
84. FED. R. EVID. 602.
85. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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If an expert were to testify in the factual situation described earlier, he
would attempt to do several things. The expert's first function would be
to explain the evidence in terms of relevance and significance to the
issue of conspiracy. He would illustrate the fact that the defendants' be-
havior mirrored one another over a course of time and would indicate
that this parallel behavior took the form of formula pricing. He would
relate the behavior of the defendants to the significance of the sealed bid
market and delivered pricing within an oligopoly. He also would indicate
the fact that the defendants refused to bid competitively. Although tech-
nical economic arguments should be avoided, some education of the
judge or the jury is necessary so that a verdict can be reached which is
based upon some of the fact finder's own inferences. Otherwise, the
judge or jury is forced to base much of its decision solely on the expert's
opinion.
The desired opinion 86 would be one that asserts that the behavior of
the defendants could only be explained by the presence of an agreement
to fix prices, or that the only possible explanation for a change in their
behavior was the termination of the conspiracy. 8 7 The expert's opinion
could be elicited by several questions. One form could be: "Could the
results observed from the computer-generated data be caused by a nor-
mally functioning bid market?" An attorney for the plaintiff might
want the expert to express his opinion that the behavior of the defend-
ants was explainable only by collusion. A sample question could be:
"What in your opinion could be the cause of the observed behavior of
the defendants?"
D. Mere Conscious Parallelism?
If the plaintiff has presented his case based soley upon the computer-
generated evidence and the expert's opinion, the issue raised is whether
the evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict.8 8
86. "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible
is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact." FED. R. EvID. 704.
87. In Armco Steel Corp. v. Adams County, 376 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1967), an
economics expert was permitted to testify that the only possible explanation for a
reduction of prices was the termination of the conspiracy. Id. at 214. See United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (the expert's deduction
was not sufficient to overcome testimony of others that competition was vigor-
ous); United States v. American Radiator & Stand. Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1970) (an expert used charts and stated his
opinion that pricing behavior was a result of vigorous competition); United
States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(experts in the banking field .were permitted to express an opinion on competi-
tion in the banking industry).
88. For a general outline of the proof requirements of conspiracy under § 1
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Even though circumstantial evidence is admissible to infer the existence
of a price-fixing conspiracy, 89 in order to sustain a submissible case the
inference must be so strong that the conduct of the alleged price-fixers
could result only from tacit or express agreement. 90 The inference may
rise from the conduct of the parties rather than from evidence of ex-
press communication. 9 However, the principal problem with cir-
cumstantial evidence is that there may be explanations of parallel be-
havior other than collusion.92 Just as it is difficult to define the point at
which a plaintiff or prosecutor has made a submissible case, it is difficult
to define what amount of evidence goes beyond conscious parallelism
and is sufficient to infer collusion.
Direct evidence is the easiest way to prove conspiracy. Such evi-
dence may consist of several varieties of interaction between the alleged
parties to the conspiracy. Joint, collaborative action by several parties to
eliminate a class of competitors is a classic form of conspiracy. 93 The
conspiracy may take other forms of concerted activity such as licensing
requirements coupled with uniformity of price. 94  Evidence of an
agreement to supply a product to a wholesaler as long as the wholesaler
adheres to a minimum price schedule, followed by adherence to such
schedule, may be enough evidence to sustain a finding of conspiracy. 95
Where uniform action follows an invitation to conspire, there is suffi-
cient evidence of a conspiracy.96  Records of communication 97 and a
course of dealings 98 between the alleged conspirators or discussions of
prices within trade associations 99 are also substantial evidence. Further-
89. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265 (1942); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
90. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
540 (1954).
91. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
92. See text accompanying notes 6-17 supra.
93. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), where
the defendants conspired to eliminate competition by terminating business deal-
ings.
94. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). In FTC v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683 (1948), there was exact price uniformity plus other evidence of con-
certed activity.
95. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
96. Moore v. Jos. H. Mathews & Co., 473 F.2d 328, 333 (9th Cir. 1973).
97. See, e.g., Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1974). There was
also economic evidence of. price uniformity unrelated to supply and demand.
98. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
99. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1966). But cf. Cement
Mfrs.' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Floors Mfrs.'
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (indicating an earlier reluctance by
the Court to condemn communications within trade associations).
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more, a reciprocal agreement to exchange prices with the effect of
stabilizing prices is highly probative of a conspiracy.100 The common
element in all the above situations is that there is direct evidence of col-
lusion.
In the absence of direct evidence, there have been situations in which
courts have refused to allow an inference of conspiracy on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. For example, one trial court determined that a
conspiracy existed when it believed evidence that identical prices were
charged as a result of a conspiracy. The appeals court reversed, noting
that government regulation, standardized major costs, economic factors,
and uniformity in the product contributed to uniformity of price. The
court concluded that the circumstantial evidence in the form of uniform
pricing was not sufficient to sustain a finding that a conspiracy
existed.' 01
There are other situations in which the courts have concluded that the
evidence is not sufficient as a matter of law to prove the existence of a
conspiracy. The classic situation is that in which there is evidence only of
uniform prices."'0 Uniform unreasonably high prices are not acceptable
as evidence of a conspiracy.' 03 The mere exchange of price information
is also not sufficient evidence of conspiracy,' 0 4 nor is an individual deci-
sion to follow a price leader sufficient. 05 Courts are likely to reject an
inference of conspiracy if similar market behavior can be explained by
economic pressure and price explained by supply and demand. 0 6 Simi-
larly, interdependence and national business decisions may coerce con-
scious parallel behavior.'0 7  Courts also have noted that uniform action
without evidence that the alleged conspirators were acting against their
100 United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
101. Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
102. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537(1953). But cf. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (the Court sustained an
FTC cease and desist order where prices were identical to the fourth decimal
point; however, there was additional evidence of concerted activity).
103. Evidence of unreasonably high prices may not be admissible because it
may be inflammatory and prejudicial, and serve to divert the jury's attention
from the issue of conspiracy. United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32
(2d Cir. 1970).
104. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
943 (1973). When the industry is oligopolistic and the exchange of price infor-
mation has the effect of stabilizing prices, it is per se illegal. United States v.
Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
105. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965).
106. Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Lawlor v. National Screen Service
Corp., 270 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1959).
107. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated,
561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977).
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own self interest in order to better the group weakens any inference of
conspiracy. 108
Moreover, some circuits have overturned district court rulings which
sustained conspiracy verdicts despite the trial courts' factual findings of
the existence of more than conscious parallelism. 10 9 This raises an im-
portant question related to computer-generated evidence: whether
computer-generated economic evidence is sufficient to support a
conspiracy verdict when such evidence is merely circumstantial or infe-
rential? Assuming that all the evidence mentioned above has been admit-
ted,110 the question can be answered by analysis and comparison with
cases in which economic evidence has been successfully used.
Economic evidence has essentially two functions; it can demonstrate a
motive for entering into an agreement and it can demonstrate occur-
rences which at some point lead to the conclusion that a conspiracy took
place. The principal motive is economic self-interest. In an oligopoly
there is substantial interdependence and the motive to stabilize prices is
strong. Thus, interdependence is a motive to maintain uniform prices"' 1
although interdependence alone has never been held to be evidence of
collusion. 112  A motive to fix prices also may exist within an industry
which has been characterized by past price-cutting forced by declining
demand.1 3 Motive also may be demonstrated where the benefit of con-
spiracy is possible only if all the parties adhere to the agreement.' 1 4 All
these factors are common within an oligopolistic market structure. Thus,
the demonstration of these factors within an oligopolistic market argu-
ably presents a motive to fix prices.
Once a motive to fix prices exists, evidence of collusion itself must be
demonstrated. Collusion is strongly suggested if individual competitors
act in apparent self-contradiction to their own economic or business in-
terests. 1 5 This factor may be demonstrated by an example. Competitor
108. Winchester Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 324 F.2d 652
(lst Cir. 1963); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962); Modern Home
Inst. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., CCH 1975-1 TRADE GAs. 60,216 (2d
Cir. 1975).
109. See Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
110. This would include charts and tables similar to those reproduced supra
relative to each defendant.
111. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968); Venzie
Corp. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975).
112. See L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST § 122 (1977). See also Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Co., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977).
113. See Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).
114. Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors, Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
115. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977); Modern
Home Inst. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 1975-1 TRADE CAS. 60,216
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A allows Competitor B to successfully win a bid several times in a row
despite A's knowledge of B's winning bids. A has allowed B to win at the
expense of his own interest in winning the bid. If B has acted recipro-
cally by failing to bid competitively in other markets, an agreement of
sorts between the two may be inferred. Competitors refuse to bid com-
petitively because noncompetitive behavior results in higher prices for all
bidders as long as each is content with its own market share. It may be
observed from Table V that Firm 2 failed to lower its bid despite losing
repeatedly on bids within that market. Other samples of this behavior
also indicate that the parties acted reciprocally and therefore suggest a
stronger inference of collusion.
Thus, the computer-generated evidence may be used to demonstrate
both a motive to enter into an agreement and action apparently in con-
tradiction of economic self-interest. In addition, the evidence dem-
onstrates the existence of formula pricing among different sizes of the
competitors' products.' 1 6  It also shows that the competitors' behavior
changed sharply after the commencement of the suit. In summation, the
evidence strongly suggests "that the conspirators had a unity of purpose
or common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an un-
lawful arrangement .... ,, 117 "Whether this conspiracy was achieved by
agreement or by acquiescence ... coupled with assistance in effectuating
its purpose is immaterial." 118
E. A Prima Facie Case
Given a substantial unanimity of motive, contradiction of individual
self-interest, adherence to a pricing formula, and a change in behavior
subsequent to the initiation of an anti-trust suit, the inference of
conspiracy is overwhelming. The expert's interpretation and opinion
based upon such facts add considerable force to the plaintiffs case. In
such a situation the plaintiff certainly has a submissible case and one
which might be difficult for the defendants to rebut.
One commentator has suggested that economic evidence of industrial
performance should be sufficient to establish a prima facie case; 11' the
(2d Cir. 1975); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., 521 F.2d 1309
(3d Cir. 1975); Winchester Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 324
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1963); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American To-
bacco Co., 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962); Mil-
gram v. Loew's Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929
(1952). See also Monroe, Price Fixing- Proof and Inference, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 84
(1971); E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 16.06
(1965).
116. See Table 4 supra.
117. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1945).
118. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944).
119. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 112, at 322.
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effect would be to force the defendants to rebut the economic evidence
by casting doubt upon its reliability or force them to explain their be-
havior in terms other than collusion. Such a shift in the burden of pro-
ducing evidence is justifiable for both policy and evidentiary reasons.
Price-fixing is a serious problem in the American economic system and
techniques are needed to combat its practice. Computer technology has
been proved to be reliable and, provided that the defendant has suffi-
cient opportunity to question its reliability, the evidence generated from
a computer should have substantial weight in the courtroom.
IV. CONCLUSION
This comment has attempted to introduce the reader to some eviden-
tiary and proof problems involved in antitrust litigation where the
charge is conspiracy and to how a novel type of evidence can be utilized
to overcome certain problems. Computer-generated evidence can pro-
vide the "something more" than conscious parallelism that courts have
required for a submissible price-fixing case. The computer allows a party
who believes that he has been the victim of an illegal conspiracy to
thoroughly analyze the behavior of alleged conspirators and discover the
"visible traces" left behind.
The computer can be helpful in analyzing and demonstrating behavior
in the market place. As illustrated earlier, it also may be used for
graphic presentation of such behavior to a judge or a jury. It may serve
to shorten a complex litigation by reducing a plethora of evidence to the
most relevant and material facts.
Computer evidence is no panacea to the problems inherent in antitrust
law, but it does present a new avenue for the enforcement of the law in
particular factual situations. As the courts more widely accept its use in
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